The suspension of New START — the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty — has left the US-Russia nuclear relationship without institutional constraints for the first time since the 1972 SALT agreements. This unprecedented situation carries profound risks for strategic stability and demands creative diplomacy to establish successor arrangements.
New START’s Legacy
New START limited each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles. Its verification regime — including on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notifications — provided transparency that reduced the risk of miscalculation. The suspension of verification activities eliminated this transparency, forcing both sides to rely on national technical means for monitoring compliance.
Obstacles to a Successor
Several structural obstacles impede negotiation of a successor agreement. Russia has conditioned future arms control on addressing US missile defense capabilities and conventional prompt strike systems. The United States has insisted that any future framework must address Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons, which outnumber American tactical weapons by a significant margin.
The China dimension adds complexity. The United States argues that China’s growing nuclear arsenal must eventually be included in multilateral arms control frameworks. Russia and China reject this approach, noting that their arsenals remain significantly smaller than US and Russian levels.
Interim Measures
In the absence of a comprehensive successor, interim measures could provide partial stabilization. Mutual commitments to transparency — including voluntary data exchanges on force structure, notification of missile flight tests, and maintenance of nuclear risk reduction centers — would provide some of the benefits of formal treaties without requiring resolution of all outstanding disagreements.
Assessment
A comprehensive successor to New START is unlikely within the current political cycle but remains a long-term strategic necessity. The interim period demands maximum investment in risk reduction measures, crisis communication channels, and analytical capacity to monitor force developments through national technical means.